Accident Proneness and Accident Law by James, Fleming, Jr.
ACCIDENT PRONENESS
ACCIDENT PRONENESS AND ACCIDENT LAW
Fleming James, Jr.* and John J. Dickinson **
T ORT law is obviously much concerned with human conduct
that produces accidents. For the past thirty years men
working in fields such as industrial psychology have been making
studies and finding things out about this conduct. To date no one
has tried to point out in any systematic and detailed way what
implications these studies and findings may have for tort law in
accident cases.
I. STUDIES ON ACCIDENT PRONENESS
For more than a quarter century there has been in the psycho-
logical literature a concept that some individuals are more likely
to have accidents than are people at large.' Their greater liabil-
ity to accidents has been called "accident proneness," which
"may be regarded as a combination of human abilities which make
a person highly proficient in bringing about accidents." 2 The
implications of this concept may best be brought out by casting
its treatment into three sections: 3 (A) Are there accident-prone
individuals? (B) What causes accident proneness? (C) What can
be done to decrease the number of accidents due to accident
proneness?
* Professor of Law, Yale Law School. B.A., Yale, 1925, LL.B., 1928.
** Member of Third-Year Class, Yale Law School. B.A., Bowdoin, i943; M.A.,
University of Maine, 1947.
' In dealing with the psychological material that follows the authors are
simply trying to describe the studies and findings of a group of men working along
the line suggested by the text. There are of course diverse schools of thought
among psychologists. We shall not try to resolve conflicts which fall within their
peculiar field of competence. We believe the existence of these conflicts does not
impair the conclusions drawn here.
IN. MAIER, PSYCHOLOGY I2 INDUSTRY 350 (1946).
Note that the word "liability" as used in the psychological literature has an
entirely different meaning from its usual one in legal literature. But both meanings
are familiar enough, and with a little attentive care the reader will readily be
able to keep the strands of definition separate. For the trouble it takes to do this,
we apologize; but the trouble does not seem nearly so great as the burden of
learning a new and entirely unfamiliar vocabulary.a Cf. Rawson, Accident Proneness, 6 PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 88 (1944).
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A. Are There Accident-Prone Individuals?
The distribution of accidents among the population is not
according to chance. Bristol estimated that ten per cent of the
working population may be responsible for seventy-five per cent
of the accidents." Blain found that four per cent of all drivers
accounted for one third of automobile accidents.' These and
many other studies point to one uncontrovertible fact: A small
portion of the population sustains a large proportion of the
accidents.
The earliest attempt to explain the distribution of accidents was
made by Greenwood and Woods in 1919. They tested three
hypotheses as to the distribution of accidents among a homogene-
ous group of women factory workers: (i) that accidents are
distributed according to chance; (2) that all workers start with
an equal accident propensity but an individual who suffers one
accident by chance may in consequence have her liability to
accident increased or decreased; (3) that some workers are from
the beginning more likely to suffer accidents than others.
After ruling out chance distribution by statistical analysis, 6
and then comparing the accident distribution of the group for two
successive periods, they found that the most tenable explanation
was the third theory, that of unequal propensities. This does not
mean, of course, that accidents never happen by chance or that
having an accident may not make for a predisposition to have
more accidents, but merely that some people start with a greater
liability to accident than others.7 Later research has verified
this conclusion.8
Other studies make it clear that contrary to widespread popu-
lar impression mechanical defects play an insignificant part in
causing automobile accidents. Thus, only 3.5 per cent of all cars
4 Bristol, Medical Aspects of Accident Control, io7 A.M.A.J. 653, 654 (1936).
' Blain, The Automobile Accident -A Medical Problem, 3 J. CRhI. PsYCHrO-
PATHOLOGY 37 ('94'); cf. H.R. Doc. No. 462, PART 6, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. z
(1938) ; Johnson, Born to Crash, Collier's, July 25, 1936, p. 28, 6o.
8 It was found that of 648 women 26 had three to five accidents. On a chance
basis only eight women would be expected to have three to five accidents. GREEN-
WOOD AND WOODs, THE INCIDENCE OF INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS UPON INDIVIDUALS
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO MULTIPLE ACCIDENTS (1919).
7 H. VERNON, ACCIDENTS AND THEIR PREVENTION 28-29 (1936).
'NEWBOLD, A CONTRIBUTION TO THE STUDY OF THE HUMAN FACTOR IN THE
CAUSATION OF ACCIDENTS (1926).
1 Canning, Motor Vehicle Inspection Records Show that Mechanical Deleds
Play Small Part in Highway Accidents, 74 AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRIES 336 (1936).
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involved in accidents have been shown to have mechanical defects,
and in only 0.25 per cent of cars involved in accidents can it be
shown that the defect played a part in causing the accident. And
mechanical inspection of vehicles has yielded disappointing results
in promoting safety.'0
In any accident situation there are two variables: the accident
potential of the situation and the reaction of the individual to that
potential." The early experimental work was done on homogene-
ous groups of workers to rule out as much as possible the working
of the first factor. Later studies, however, tried to determine just
how much weight should be given to the accident potential of the
situation, particularly in traffic accidents which occur under con-
ditions so varied in point of danger. This research showed that,
while high accident potential increases the likelihood of accidents
for all drivers, the differential between the rates of the accident-
free and the accident-prone groups remains. 2 A high accident
potential and an accident-prone driver make for a high accident
expectancy. A high accident potential and a normal driver make
for an accident possibility.
A warning should be noted here: accident proneness means a
predisposition to have an undue number of accidents, but the
high-accident group may contain some individuals who are not
accident-prone. 3 The problem has been to see whether there
are any traits, or groups of them, which are often enough asso-
10 See Cardall, Psychological Factors in Accident Prevention, 26 PERSONNEL J.
288 (1948) ("It is not the machine which should be regarded as hazardous so much
as the individual who is operating that machine"); cf. FARIER AND CHAinERS, A
STUDY or ACCIDENT PRONENESS AMONG MOTOR DR-vE s (1939); U.S. BUR. MINES
REP. No. 6367, 3 (1930) ; Bingham, Psychology and Highway Safety, 31 SCInrNc
MONTHLY 552, 553 (1930) (three fourths to nine tenths of all automobile accidents
are caused by human failure); Miles, The Psychology of Accidents, 5 J. NAT. INST.
IND'L PSYCH. 183 (1930) ; Myers, Human Factor in Accidents, 8 HuMm FACTOR 266
(1934).
11 See Farmer, Accident Proneness and Accident Liability, 14 OCCUPATIONAL
PSYCH. 121 (1940).
12 See Forbes and Kraft, A New Theory of Traffic Accident Incidence, 38 PSYCH.
BULL. 531 (1941) (complete dissimilarity of the accident-exposure curve and the
accident curve shows that exposure to accident had little to do with who had the
accidents). But see Williams, Accidents on the Roads, i9 PUBLIC ROADS 77,
78-79 (1938) (four out of five accidents occur on dry roads in clear weather and
while the car is traveling straight ahead)."3 See, e.g., Foa~m:R AND CHAmERS, A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY O INDIVIDUAL
DIPE~RENds IN ACCIDENT RATES 3 (1926)., And, conversely, an occasional accident-
prone person may escape actually having accidents during any period studied.
1950]
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
ciated with high accident frequency to furnish a reliable indica-
tion of the existence of the predisposition.
B. What Causes Accident Proneness?
Tests for detecting accident proneness follow a general pat-
tern. Individuals are selected who have accident .rates appreci-
ably higher than the mean for the population studied. The whole
sample population is then given a test to measure some specific
characteristic or ability, and a correlation is made between the
test scores and the accident records of the two groups. If there
is a significant difference in performance on the test between the
two groups the characteristic or ability measured is probably con-
nected with accident proneness. Such factors fall conveniently
under five headings: (i) habits and skills, (2) physical character-
istics, (3) psychomotor characteristics, (4) mental characteristics
and attitudes, and (5) age and experience. 4
Habits and Skills. - Defective operating habits of motor
vehicle drivers may easily render them accident-prone. A simple
example will suffice. 5 During his service a bus driver had had
eighteen accidents which the company after investigation had
charged to the fault of the other driver. An analysis of the acci-
dents, however, showed them all to be of the same kind - another
driver had run into the left rear fender of the bus. Observation
disclosed that this operator drove his bus close to the curb until
he came to a parked car. He would then signal in the prescribed
manner and swing the bus out into traffic. The driver of the car
behind would miss the signal and hit the left rear fender of the
bus as it swung in front of him. When the driver was trained to
ease out into traffic rather than swing out, accidents charged to
the "carelessness" of others ceased.
Physical Characteristics. - After a thorough analysis one
investigator found a significant correlation between accident
proneness and the results of comprehensive visual tests. 6 With
14 Miles, supra note io, at 186, would classify accident-prone automobile drivers
under the headings of physical factors, mental factors, and operating defects (habits
and skills). Ogilvie, Abstract of Discussion on Accident Proneness, io7 A.M.A.J. 655
(1936), would classify accident-prone industrial workmen under the headings of
physical defects, job misplacement, and the uneducable.
15 Bingham, The Accident-Prone Driver, 6 HurmAs FACTOR 158 (1932).
16 Stump, A Statistical Study of Visual Functions and Industrial Safety, 29 J.
APPnIED PsYcH. 467 (1945); see J. T-nT, INDUSTRIAL PSYcHooOGY 293 (1942)




the exception of vision, however, most of the studies show little
correlation between physical characteristics and accident rate.
Psychomotor Characteristics. - Most testing of accident
proneness has involved stimulus-response measurements.' 8 Sig-
nificant positive correlations have been found, but these correla-
tions have been small in most cases. The reason for this may be
that isolated characteristics have generally been tested, while the
cause of accident proneness is a complex of relationships which
is more than the mere sum of the individual factors. 9 Thus,
sensori-motor skills show a correlation with the accident rates of
skilled but not of unskilled industrial workers." And poor co-
ordination may be associated with accident rate only when a time
limit is put on the test.2 ' Perhaps the most significant experiment
along this line revealed only a slight correlation between scores
on perception tests and accident rate, and between scores on
tests of co-ordination and accident rate. The difference between
the scores on the two tests, however, showed a high correlation
with accident rate. In other words, "the person who reacts quicker
than he can perceive is more likely to have accidents than the
person who can perceive quicker than he can react." 22
Mental Characteristics and Attitudes. - In a study made in the
" Adler, The Psychology of Repeated Accidents in Industry, 98 Am. J. PSYCHI-
ATRY 99 (1941) (organic disease); Johnson and Lauer, A Study of the Effect of
Induced Manual Handicaps on Automotive Performance in Relation to Reaction
Time, 2i J. APPLIED PSYCH. 85 (1937) (manual disability).
" Farmer, The Study of Personal Differences in Accident Liability, 3 J. NAT.
INST. IND'. PSYCH. 432, 433-34 (1927). Tests for accident proneness are legion.
They range from Brintnall, A Study of Some Driving Habits of Commercial Drivers,
14 J. Soc. PSYCH. 159 (1941) (automobile acceleration rates) to Kroeber-Keneth,
Unfallneigung und Handschrift, 14 Z='scHRrr FOR lMENSCHENKUNDE 17 (1938)
(handwriting analysis). There are psychophysical tests for reaction time, resistance
to distraction, vigilance, visual co-ordination, vision, judgment of relative size of
near and distant objects, judgment of speeds. See Johnson, Detection and Treat-
ment of Accident-Prone Drivers, 43 PSYCH. BULL. 489 (1946); Miles and Vincent,
The Institute's Test for Motor Drivers, 8 Humm FACTOR 245 (1934).
" Predictions of accident frequency may be based on the composite scores on
a number of tests, or on an analysis of the accident records, or preferably on a
combination of the two. However, the most that has actually been done to date
is to divide the tested population into classes with different accident propensities.
Johnson, supra note x8, at 520-21.
2o Chambers, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Part Played by Character and
Temperament in Accident Causation, 85 J. MENTAL SCINCE 115 (1939).
21 Lahy and Korngold, Recherches expdrimentales sur la psychologie des sujets




Thirties in connection with the development of psychosomatic
medicine, hospital patients were separated into different classi-
fications according to the disease for which they were admitted.
Those with fractures were examined to see whether they differed
appreciably in mental characteristics from the general patient
population.23 The findings of this study and others 24 show that
the personality traits of the accident victim conformed to a pattern
not observed among patients admitted for other causes. As a
group the fracture patients had a low illness record, high previous
accident rate, small families, and a high percentage of childless
marriages. A relatively large number had long-established anxiety
hysteria, having had agoraphobia and claustrophobia and par-
ticularly fear of falling. The members of the group were restless
and given to feverish activity under emotional stress. Normal in
appearance and with few neurotic traits, they were casual about
feelings and personal problems. There was less interest in in-
tellectual values and greater inclination to make snap judgments.
One of the outstanding characteristics of the fracture group was
the high resistance to authority which resulted in suicide tenden-
cies or the need for self-punishment, either of which were ful-
filled by having accidents. When the pressure from authority or
aggressive hostility had reached an intolerable point, members of
the group were more apt to engage in violent activity than to try
to solve the problem on a rational basis. This suggests that many
accidents are symptomatic behavior; in fact, "one is struck by
the number of cases in which apparent accidents are not accidents
at all." 25
In all people there are cycles of exhilaration and depression.
Although the period of depression usually lasts for not more than
2 Dunbar, Wolfe, and Rioch, Psychic Component in Fracture, 93 Am. J.
PSYCHIATRY 649 (1936), 95 id. 1319 (1937).
By using "mental" as an element in causation of accident proneness the authors
do not wish to imply that they subscribe to a mind-body separation. The word is
merely one of convenience under which will be classed such factors as intelligence
and emotional causes.
24 H. DTJNBAR, PsycHosom A c DIAGNOSIS 245-47 (1943) ; Bingham, Individual
Differences in Industrial Personnel, 15 EUGRNIcAr. NEWS 19, 21 (1930); Miles,
supra note io, at 184-85.
2Dunbar, Wolfe, and Rioch, Psychic Component in Fracture, 93 Am. J.
PsYcHIATRY 649, 676 (1936). The initial reaction of the accident victim was a
feeling of guilt, but this was quickly repressed, and the victim disclaimed all re-
sponsibility. This has an obvious bearing on the reliability of spontaneous state-
ments made by a participant at the scene of an accident.
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twenty per cent of the time, one investigator found that fifty
per cent of industrial accidents happened while the workers were
depressed.26 In addition, industrial output was 6.8 per cent
higher when the workers were not in the depressed phase.2 7
According to the accepted view, a certain minimum of intelli-
gence is necessary if the worker is to be accident-free; but, above
this minimum, intelligence has little dr nothing to do with acci-
dent proneness.28
Age and Experience.- Automobile drivers under twenty-five
have a disproportionate number of accidents.2 9 This is due to
attitudes toward driving as well as to lack of skill; natural ex-
uberance and the wish to test one's ability are not conducive to
safety. But, since these are attitudes shared by most of us and
are usually tempered by time, they belong on the periphery of
the concept of accident proneness. The inexperienced also have
more than their share of accidents,3" but inexperience like youth
is common to many and is temporary. Moreover, among be-
ginners the same division is to be found between those who are
relatively accident-prone and those who are relatively accident-
free.3 1
Significant for their absence from the causes of accident prone-
ness are "carelessness" or "fault." "Recent medical research has
shown that 'accident proneness' may be an innate characteristic
of some individuals and a personal phenomenon independent of
any question of responsibility, conscious action or blameworthi-
ness." 32
2 Hersey, Emotional Factors in Accidents, IS PERSONNEL J. 59, 6o (1936).
27 Hersey, Rate of Production and Emotional State, 1o PERSONNEL J. 355, 357
(1932).
28 Chambers, supra note 2o, at 118. Contra: Henig, Some Psychological Aspects
of Industrial Accident Prevention, 64 SAFETY ENGINEERING 61 (1932).
29 H.R. Doc. No. 462, PAur 6, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1938); Johnson, Bio-
graphical Methods of Detecting Accident-Prone Drivers, 35 PsYCH. BULL. 511, 512
(1938); Raphael, Labine, Flinn, and Hoffman, One Hundred Traffic Offenders,
13 MENTAL HYGIENE 809, 811 (1929); Forbes, Age Performance Relationships
among Accident-Repeater Automobile Drivers, 2 J. CONSULTING PsYcHI. 143 (1938).
30 See HERBERT MOORE, PSYCHOI.OGY FOR BusmNEss AND INDUSTRY 359 (2d ed.
1942) ; J. TIuIN, INDUSTRIAL PSYCHOLOGY 294-97 (1942).
31 FARMER AND CHAMBERS, A STUDY OF ACCIDENT PRONENESS AMEONG MOTOR
DRIVERS 9 (I939).
2 Bristol, Medical Aspects of Accident Control, 107 A.MA.J. 653, 654 (1936).




C. What Can Be Done to Decrease the Number of
Accidents Due to Accident Proneness?
The hypothesis of accident proneness has met the pragmatic
test - action based on the analysis of tests and past accident
records has consistently led to decrease in the future accident
rate." This action may follow one of several lles: therapeutic
work with accident-prone employees may be undertaken; they
may be shifted to jobs of low accident potential; or the accident-
prone may be excluded in the hiring and firing of employees. The
drastic method of exclusion runs into serious collateral difficulties,
since all of those who are accident-prone - about four per cent of
the total population - can scarcely be kept out of work and off
the roads.The first two methods, however, have often been used
effectively 34 alone or in combination. A trucking concern, for
example, which employed many drivers and covered several million
miles a year, analyzed the accident records of all its drivers to
determine which were accident-prone. The accident-prone drivers
were then shifted to departments with low accident potential and
their places filled by new drivers whose records were kept under
similar scrutiny. At the end of seven years, the company found
that upon shifting one eighth of the drivers it had decreased its
accidents by 78 per cent while the total mileage had increased
slightly.35 In this connection it should be pointed out that the
concept of classes of unequal liability is especially useful to in-
" Various batteries of tests have been put into operation and have been found
reliable enough to justify commercial use. See, e.g., FARMR, CIABERS, Am Knuic,
TESTS FOR ACCIDENT PRONENESS 28 (1933); Miles and Vincent, The Institute's
Test for Motor Drivers, 8 HxMA FACTOR 245, 246 ('934); cf. Lahy and Korn-
gold, Recherche expirimentale sur les causes psychologiques des accidents du travail,
COITES RENDUS DE VIIe CONFRENCE INT'L DE PSYCHOTECHNIQUE 140-47 (1935).
But see Slocombe, The Psychology of Safety, 20 PERSONNEL J. 42, 1o 5 (1941).
" The efficacy of the first method was reported by Myers, The Human Factor
in Accidents, 8 I-uILN FACTOR 266, 269-70 (I934) (restaurant breakage reduced
53% by retraining). See also Bingham, Individual Differences in Industrial Per-
sonnel, i5 EUGENICAL NEWS 19, 23 (1930) (individual attention to high-accident
employees cut accident rate 41% in two years) ; Drake, The Prediction and Control
of Accidents, 51 SCIENTIFIC MONTHLY 74, 76 (1940) (workers hired on basis of
estheto-kinetic co-ordination scores had 70% less accidents than others); Miles,
The Psychology of Accidents, 5 J. NAT. INST. IND'L PsYcH. 183, 186 (1930)
(accidents cut 42.7% in one industry by retraining).
" Johnson, Born to Crash, Collier's, July 25, 1936, p. 28. The generalized
character of accident proneness was illustrated by the fact that the accident rates
rose in the departments to which the accident-prone drivers were shifted.
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surance companies, large employers, and others who have the
opportunity to work on an actuarial basis. 6
II. ACCIDENT PRONENESS AND ABSOLUTE LIABILITY
How do the results of these studies bear on the desirability of
retaining fault as the cardinal principle of civil liability in accident
cases? Accidents and their consequences today pose a serious
social problem 7 Its solution calls for two things: (i) measures
which will cut down accidents; (2) measures which will minimize
the bad effects of those accidents which do happen.3 8 These
measures must not, however, cost society too much in other direc-
tions; they must not, for example, unduly inhibit valuable but
dangerous activity.39 Moreover, they must on the whole satisfy
the ethical or moral sense of the community, its feeling of what
is fair and just."
Let us now examine the implications of the recent studies for
the fault principle in the light of the possible objectives which
that principle should serve.
The Moral Objective. - The fault principle is sought to be
justified in part by the inherent fairness of imposing liability on
him who has been guilty of some personal moral shortcoming
(here generally negligence) and of shielding from liability the
man who has been free from blame.4 Of course, the legal standard
"6 See Cardall, Psychological Factors in Accident Prevention, 26 PERSONNEL J.
288, 293 (1948) ("in modern industrial operation, ignorance of methods so readily
and cheaply available is no excuse for accidents attributable to psychological and
physiological deficiencies").
" During 1948 approximately 98,ooo people were killed and 1o,30o,oo injured
in the United States by accident. The direct economic loss has been estimated at
$7,400,000,000 (including $715,ooo,ooo loss by fire). NATIONAL SAFETr COUNCIL,
ACCIDENT FACTS io (1949 ed.).
"See HJLvEY AND WANDEL, WORKEN'S COMPENSATION AND AUTOMOBILE
LasAIATrY INsuRANcE 3N~ VniGonA i (1931); cf. COLUMBIA UNIV. COUNCIL FOR RE-
SEARCH IN SocIAL SCIENCES, REP. CON[ITTEE TO STUDY COMPENSATION FOR AUTO-
MOB= ACCIDENTS [hereinafter COLumBIA REPORT] 55, 66, 219, 222 (1932);
Corstvet, The Uncompensated Accident and Its Consequences, 3 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 466 (1936).
" See SALMOND, TORTS 439 (ioth ed. 1945) ; cf. CARwozo, THE PARADoxES OF
LEGAL SCIENCE 57-58 (1928); GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 76-77 (1930).
"'The possible objective of inflicting punishment does not play an important
part in this field of tort law. See PROSSER, TORTS 28 (1941) ; cf. SALMOND, TORTS
18.
4 See Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HAav. L. Rav. 97, 1oo (19o8) ("the ethical
quality of the defendant's act has become the measure of his liablity instead of
the mere physical act regardless of the motive or fault of the actor"); SALMOND,
TORTS I8 et seq.; Smith, Tort and Absolute Liability -Suggested Changes in
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of conduct is largely external and does not take into account the
actor's personal equation with the result that legal fault does not
entirely coincide with moral fault. But apologists of the present
system justify it on the ground that by and large the two do
coincide4 The tendency of the recent studies, however, has
been to cut down the importance of personal moral shortcoming
as a factor in causing accidents and to do so in many cases where
the "layman's common sense" would find something to blame.3
To be sure, personal fault is not entirely ruled out,44 but the scope
of personal blameworthiness has been very drastically narrowed.
If, then, the fault principle is carried to its logical conclusion -
so that liability is imposed only where there is personal blame
-liability will become more and more restricted.
The Securing of Compensation to Accident Victims. -The
present system recognizes this too as one of its objectives and
awards compensatory damages whenever that may be done with-
out offending its premises as to morality, as by making a blame-
less man pay damages, or to expediency, as by unduly inhibiting
desirable conduct.4 5 But we have just seen how the recent studies
have narrowed the sphere of culpability and how this would cause
a great restriction of liability if many accident-prone but morally
blameless people are not to be held liable. This would mean, in
turn, that a greatly increased number of victims would go un-
compensated. The recent studies thus emphasize sharply the
essential conflict between refining the fault principle and com-
pensating accident victims. 6 Of course, as we shall see, the
existing rules are now and could continue to be administered so
as to conceal this dilemma, e.g., by the use of an external standard
Classification, 30 HARv. L. REv. 241, 259 (1917). But cf. Seavey, Speculations as
to "Respondeat Superior" in HARv. LEGAL ESSAYS, 433, 437 et seq. (i934).
42 See POLLOCK, TORTS 8 (14th ed. 1939) ; Smith, supra note 41, at 254-55, 262.
"This is the tenor of most of the studies listed in Part I, supra; note, e.g.,
the kinds of factors listed as causing accident proneness. See also N. MAIER, PsY-
CHOLOGY IN INDUSTRY 354 (1946); Myers, Human Factor in Accidents, 8 HUMAN
FACTOR 266, 279 (1934).
"An occasional student finds more room for "fault" than do most. See, e.g.,
Henig, supra note 28.
45 GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 76-77, 142 (1930); Pou ocK, TORTS 47 (Excursus A,
by Landon).
4 Quite independently of the recent studies there is a very strong case indeed
for the social importance of compensating accident victims. See materials cited
in note 38 supra; Ballantine, A Compensation Plan for Railway Accident Claims,
29 HARV. L. REv. 705 (1916); Marx, Compulsory Compensation Insurance, 25
COL. L. REV. 164 (1925).
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of conduct for defendants; but this goes a long way towards an
abandonment of the moral justification of the fault principle."
That does not, of course, end the matter, for even if personal
culpability should be disregarded altogether, the present system
could perhaps be justified on the ground of expediency. The
claims of the injured innocent are meritorious and will be satisfied
where the injury is caused by unreasonably dangerous conduct,
for such conduct, by hypothesis, involves danger out of proportion
to its social worth .4  But the exaction of compensation from one
whose conduct is not unreasonably dangerous would impose an
undue burden on desirable, affirmative activity which would be
out of proportion to the benefit conferred on victims. The line
which separates these two kinds of conduct, then, is the expedient
one to draw between liability and nonliability for injury, since it
combines a considerable incentive towards safety and a minimum
of interference with desirable enterprise. In view of this possible
contention, 49 let us see what implications the recent-studies have
for the argument from expediency.
The Deterrence of Conduct which Causes Accidents.- The
results of the recent studies will themselves tend to promote safety
and reduce accidents under any system of liability. But we be-
lieve this tendency would be stronger under a system of absolute
liability than under a continuation of the fault principle. In the
47 just as the dilemma could be concealed by the increasing use of fictions, i.e.,
the continued use of the vocabulary of ethics to denote concepts which become in-
creasingly amoral, so also could the withdrawal and abandonment be concealed.
But none of this could alter the underlying fact that
Words strain,
Crack and sometimes break, under the burden,
Under the tension, slip, slide, perish,
Decay with imprecision, will not stay in place,
Will not stay still.
T. S. Eliot, Burnt Norton
in COLLECTED POEM S 1909-1935, 211, 219 (1947).
While we do not believe that accident law should abandon a moral objective,
we do feel that the present system largely lacks the moral justification claimed for
it. Cf. Seavey, Speculations as to "Respondeat Superior" in HARv. LEGAL ESSAYS
433, 442 (1934). Our conclusion from this, however, is not that the "fault" basis
should be perpetuated without regard to morals, but that there should be a shift
in the direction of emphasizing social as against individual morality. Cf. PROSSER,
TORTS 21 (1941); Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doc-
trines, 27 HARv. L. REV. 195, 233 (1914). But see Pound, The Involuntary Good
Samaritan, Fortune, Nov., 1949, P. 171.
48 RESTATE-MENT, TORTS § 291, comment a (1934); Seavey, Negligence - Sub-
jective or Objective?, 41 HARV. L. REV. I, 7 (1927); Terry, Negligence, 29 HARv.
L. REV. 40, 42 (1915).
" HoLmis, THE CoirmoN LAW 94-96 (i8i); SALMOND, TORTS 436.
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first place, the recent studies emphasize the extent to which large
units, such as transportation companies, government, and insur-
ance companies, are in a strategic position to reduce accidents.
Conversely, they emphasize the relatively insignificant part which
the individual's conscious free choice plays in causing or pre-
venting accidents.
Secondly, a system of absolute liability tends to increase the
pressure towards accident prevention on large groups and enter-
prises, where we have seen it will do the most good, rather than
on the individual, where it will do relatively little good. This
is so for three reasons: (i) large units are involved in many acci-
dents and appear often as defendants, rarely as claimants; (2)
even where the accident is caused by an individual while acting
for himself, in his aspect as potential defendant he is increasingly
becoming covered by liability insurance, so that the pressure of
increased liability is put in the first instance on the insurance
company; 5" (3) the abolition of the defense of contributory
negligence -which usually accompanies a shift to absolute lia-
bility - clearly adds a further incentive to safety on the part of
perennial defendants, and if there is a corresponding loss of in-
centive (which is:not at all clear) it is on the part of the individuals
who are potential accident victims.
Since the large business or governmental unit is in a far better
position to reduce accidents than is the isolated individual, and
since absolute liability puts added pressure to reduce accidents
on the large unit, it follows that absolute liability will be a greater
spur to safety than a system of less strict liability. "If the law
requires a perfect score in result, the actor is more likely to strive
for that than if the law requires only the ordinary precautions to
be taken ... ." " Available facts substantiate theory rather
dramatically. Not only were the recent studies themselves under-
taken by large units, but they were in the main undertaken be-
cause of the increased liability put upon such -units by workmen's
compensation acts. - Moreover, the drop in the industrial fa-
ll Cf. James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insur-
ance, 57 YALE L.J. 549 (1948). The uninsured driver seldom pays. See COLU1rBIA
REPORT 28-29 (1932).
11 Seavey, Speculations as to "Respondeat Superior" in HARv. LEGAL ESSAYS 433,
447 (1934); cf. Arizona Employers' Liability Cases, 250 U.S. 400, 432-33 (1919)
(Holmes, J., concurring).
52-Moore, op. cit. supra note 30, at 378, 'says of workmen's compensation
statutes, "The result has been an increased interest in safety rules and in discovering
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tality rate since the passage of those acts has been truly remark-
able - it was cut in half between the two wars.53
The Encouragement or Discouragement of Enterprise. - Per-
haps the heaviest artillery which the proponents of the fault
principle can muster is the contention that any stricter rule of
liability will discourage affirmative activity and unduly fetter de-
sirable enterprise. If this were true, it would constitute a prag-
matic objection to a scheme of absolute liability which would cer-
tainly deserve serious consideration. But like so many appeals
to practical common sense this one probably rests on no solid
foundation of fact but simply on a bald assertion of plausible
error. If a system of absolute liability involves fixed limitations
on the amount to be recovered, as in the case of workmen's com-
pensation, it may actually cost little or no more than a system
where liability is for negligence as determined by a jury without
limitation on the amount.5" In any event there is small reason
to claim that the advent of workmen's compensation has had any
effect in checking the phenomenal advances in applied science and
industry which have taken place since that time. On the con-
those who are accident prone." See also N. MAIER, PSYCHOLOGY IN INDUSTRY 320
(1946). As early as 1929 the Cleveland Railway Company and the Metropolitan
Insurance Company were doing work on accident proneness. See METROPOLITAN
Lim INS. Co., THE ACCIDENT-PRONE ExPLOYEE (1929).
" Hall, Everybody's Job, 47 Best's Ins. News (Fire & Cas. Ed.), March, 1947,
p. 85, 96; cf. America's Loss through Fatal Accidents, 39 id. 769 (1939).
4 The comprehensive schemes that have been put forward provide for some
such limitation. See, e.g., COLUMBIA REPORT 140-42, 213 (1932); Marx, The
Curse of the Personal Suit and a Remedy, io A.B.AJ. 493 (1924). But even
where stricter liability has not been coupled with any corresponding limitation
upon recovery, the additional burden it imposes apparently will not have a material
effect in stiffing enterprise. Canals in England were early subjected by statute to
rigorously strict liability for damage from escaping water, Peak Forest Canal Act,
1794, 34 GEO. 3, C. 26, § x5, yet the development of canals went further in England
than here. Compare BOWDEN, KARPOVICH, AND USHER, AN ECONOMI HISTORY OF
EUROPE SINCE 1750, 1I5 (1937) with BINING, THE RISE OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC
LIFE 211-16 (1943). In some states absolute liability was imposed for damage
from blasting even though caused by concussion, see Smith, Liability for Substan-
tial Physical Damage to Land by Blasting -The Rile of the Future, 33 HARV.
L. REv. 542, 544 (1920), but there is no indication that the negligence rule else-
where applied has discouraged building and construction less than strict liability
has. Absolute liability obviously has not prevented development in the most
familiar fields where it has been tried-aircraft and railroads. See, e.g., MAss.
GEN. LAWS c. x6o, § 234 (1932) (absolute liability for fires set by railroad engines) ;
UF Foam AERONAUTICS ACT §§ g, IT (1922). These instances also suggest that
absolute liability does not unduly retard or clog development; at least they furnish
no comfort to those who would assert the contrary.
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trary, there is good reason to believe that any pressure which the
stricter liability has exerted has spurred the business man's in-
genuity to find new devices and new ways of doing things which
have at the same time cut down accidents and also increased pro-
ductive efficiency. The coupling of these results will not be merely
sporadic and accidental. Aside from any question of civil liability,
accidents are costly to employers and disrupt production, and on
the whole the cost of devices and techniques for avoiding them
will be more than offset by the elimination of this waste and dis-
ruption. The recent studies show that the type of behavior which
produces accidents is often inefficient behavior from the point of
view of production, even where it does not actually succeed in
bringing about an accident; and they illustrate how effective
efforts towards safety may serve the end of productivity as well."
More broadly they illustrate how the fear of greater accident
liability tends not to discourage but actually to foster the most
useful kind of productive activity.
III. ACCIDENT PRONENESS AND THE FAULT PRINCIPLE
For the present, however, liability generally is imposed only
when there is some kind of fault; and for the most part con-
tributory fault is a bar to recovery. At least a formal adherence
to this system is likely to continue for some little time. So it is
worth while to see what implications the recent studies have for the
administration of the fault principle even if they point most
clearly to its abandonment altogether.
Standard of Conduct of Participants. - Is a person's accident
proneness or its opposite to be considered in determining what
for him is reasonable conduct? Or is a man to be held to the
average of behavior of the community without making any allow-
ance for, let us say, his slow reaction time, or his poor co-
ordination, or his emotionally upset state? This, of course, is an
old question in a slightly new form. Is an external standard of
care to be taken, or is the individual's behavior to be judged in
the light of his own personal equation? On the whole, the law has
" Increased production in nearly every industry is accompanied by a decrease
in the accident rate. Ain=Ac ENGnEERING CouNcIL, SAFETY AND PRODUCTION
76-8o (1928). As we have just seen, the industrial accident rate has dropped
sharply during the past decades. During the same period the increase in pro-
ductivity has been just as striking, Bowden, Wages, Hours, and Productivity of
Industrial Labor, xgog to z939, 5i MONTHLY LABOR REv. 517, 530 (1940).
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chosen an objective standard," but that is not universally so,
and there has been a good deal of disagreement lately as to whether
greater allowance should be made for the individual's short-
comings.5" So the matter will bear re-examination in the light of
the recent studies.
The case for the subjective standard rests largely on the assump-
tion that legal fault, as a basis of civil liability, should correspond
as closely as possible with personal moral shortcoming. It is an
attempt to refine the fault principle.58 It is unfair, so runs the
argument, to require the blind to see, 9 the deaf to hear,60 or the
young child to have the judgment or experience of the adult. 1
The case for the objective standard is more complex. The
arguments that have traditionally been given for it are either un-
convincing or incomplete. One that is almost always advanced is
the practical impossibility of administering any standard which
would call for measuring the infinite and imponderable differences
among men. 2 But this argument from convenience - if not from
necessity - may perfectly well be coupled with a concession that
an individualized standard would be preferable if there were some
feasible way to apply it."5 Some have found support for the ex-
ternal standard in the need for uniformity.64
Another argument for the objective standard stresses the
interests of the injured person. The awkward man's "slips are
"o The social insurance concept first appeared in the field of workmen's com-
pensation. See Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 2oi N.Y. 271, 296, 94 N.E. 431, 440
(igI). Recently great strides have been made towards social insurance in some
fields where it had formerly been thought out of the question. But as to accidents
little further progress has been made. This may be for two reasons: (i) Possibly
the law in the accident field is resilient enough to achieve some of the practical effect
of social insurance without specifying absolute liability. (2) There have been no
pressure groups championing absolute liability.
57 See Charbonneau v. MacRury, 84 N.H. 5oi, 153 AtI. 457 (1931); RESTATE-
MENT, TORTS § 283, comment e (1934); Seavey, Negligence -Subjective or Ob-
jective?, 41 H[ARv. L. REV. 1, 27 (1927).
"8 See HoLMms, THE COmmON LAW 112 ("It is the coarseness, not the nature,
of the external standard which is objected to."); Ames, Law and Morals, 22
HARv. L. REv. 97, oo (1908).
11 Hefferon v. Reeves, 140 Minn. 505, x67 N.W. 423 (1918).
60 Furtado v. Bird, 26 Cal. App. X52, X46 Pac. 58 (1914).
1 Johnson v. St. Paul City Ry., 67 Minn. 260, 69 N.W. go (1897); RESTATE-
MENT, TORTS § 283, comment e (1934).12 HOLuEs,*THE CommoN LAW Io8.
" See, e.g., Charbonneau v. MacRury, supra note 57, at 512, 153 At]. at 463;
cf. GREEN, JUDGE AND JuRy I6I.
64 See PROSSER, TORTS 225.
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no less troublesome to his neighbors than if they sprang from
guilty neglect." 65 To the extent that we are concerned with a
defendant's conduct the clue to the strongest case for an external
standard is to be found in the last argument. This case proceeds
from the premise that in accident law today the object of com-
pensating accident victims is more important than that of re-
fining the fault principle, so that where the two objectives conflict,
compensation should prevail. Since the subjective test by and
large relaxes the standard,66 its application to defendants to secure
a refinement of fault would reduce the chance of compensation
and would therefore be bad.
How then do the recent studies bear on these arguments? In
the first place, as we have seen, the studies cast grave doubt on
the feasibility and the desirability of retaining the fault principle
at all. They cast the same doubt on any step to bring about a closer
correspondence between legal fault and the moral quality of the
a~ctor's conduct, since they show that the bulk of conduct which
is unreasonably dangerous from an objective point of view is not
attended by personal blameworthiness. It follows that further
refinement of the fault principle deserves less weight as an ob-
jective of tort law than the objective of compensating accident
victims, and as we have just seen, this proposition tends to support
the case for an objective standard for defendants.
On the other hand, the recent studies perhaps diminish the
force of one contention traditionally urged in favor of the objective
standard, namely, the impossibility of measuring the differences
among men. Already they furnish a reasonable basis for measuring
some differences and further progress will come with time. But
even if this progress pushes back the realm of what it is impossible
to show, there would still be practical difficulties. The trial of a
negligence case would become in part a psychological examination
of the participants and a battleground of tests and of experts and
their theories. Moreover, even if the measurements can be made -
at the cost of considerable trial time and effort, and confusion of
the jury - the question still remains whether it is worthwhile
to make them in determining civil liability.
6 5 HoL Es, THE CommoN LAW io8.
6 6 Theoretically, of course, the subjective test will take account of the de-
fendant's superior skills, etc., and thus open up additional avenues of recovery.
Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v. Waldrop, 237 Ala. 2o8, i86 So. x5i (1939); RE-
STATEMENT, TORTS § 299, comment f (1934). But in practice this comes to little.
In the majority of cases the test is invoked to "temper the wind to the shorn lamb."
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One more broad consideration should be noted. The recent
studies indicate that a great deal of the accident-producing be-
havior, on the part of all the immediate participants in an accident,
involves accident proneness. A determination, therefore, that it
should be considered in fixing the legal standard of conduct will
at least theoretically affect a very large number of accident cases.
So much for general considerations. Let us next examine the
problem more concretely, in the light of them. First should come
the more or less analogous legal precedents. The jury will gener-
ally be told to take into account the physical characteristics of
the actor in judging what is reasonable conduct.0 7 This is true
not only of such palpable characteristics as blindness and one-
leggedness, but also of poor vision and defective bones." As we
have seen, some factors contributing to accident proneness are of
this kind, so that existing precedents cover them or are tolerably
close.69 The immaturity of childhood is widely thought entitled to
consideration,7  but probably the inexperience of the novice is
not.71 Allowance is generally not made for more complex psycho-
logical factors, such as mental characteristics and attitudes.72
Psychomotor characteristics, such as reaction time, could be
assimilated to either line of precedents, so far as legal doctrine
goes. 73
Two aspects of the cases that have arisen deserve special at-
tention. One has already been mentioned-the tendency of a
6" RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 289, comment h (1934); see Weisiger, Negligence of
the Physically Infirm, 24 N.C.L. REv. 187 (1946).
68 Wray v. Fairfield Amusement Co., 126 Conn. 221, 1o A.2d 6oo (1940); see
Weisiger, supra note 67.
" E.g., tunnel vision, poor co-ordination, slow reaction time.
70 At least when the child is a plaintiff. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 283, comment e
(1934); cf. id. § 289, comment h; see Shulman, The Standard of Care Required of
Children, 37 YALE L.J. 618 (1928).
"' Hughey v. Lennox, 142 Ark. 593, 219 S.W. 323 (1920); Goff v. Hubbard,
217 Ky. 729, 290 S.W. 696 (1927) (driving under dealer's tutelage); Holland v.
Pitocchelli, 299 Mass. 554, 13 N.E.2d 390 (1938) (picking isolated spot in the
country to learn to drive). But see RESTATEM ET, TORTS § 290, comment b (1934).
Cleary v. Eckart, 191 Wis. 114, 21o N.W. 267 (1926), has been cited for the
proposition that a beginner is held only to a "reasonably prudent beginner"
standard. Morris, Role of Expert Testimony in the Trial of Negligence Issues,
26 TEx. L. REv. i, 18 (1947). But in the Cleary case the inexperienced defendant
was held not liable to his guest for injuries on the ground that plaintiff had
assumed the risk of defendant's known inexperience.
72 See, e.g., HARPER, TORTS § I44 (1933) ; PROSSER, TORTS § og.




subjective test in practice to relax the required standard. This
means that any step towards further individualization of the test
will help accident victims get compensation when it is applied to
the issue of contributory negligence, but it will cut down their
chances for compensation when used to determine the liability of
a defendant. The second noteworthy thing about these cases is
that of those which do apply a relaxed individualized standard
the overwhelming majority relax the standard on the issue of
contributory negligence, in favor of the accident victim. 4
From the foregoing analysis two questions emerge: (i) Should
an explicit double standard be adopted so that a plaintiff's conduct
is judged in the light of his handicaps, including accident prone-
ness, while a defendant's conduct is viewed objectively? (2) If
an explicit double standard is not adopted, is an implicit double
standard likely to prevail in practice? We believe that the answers
to both questions should be in the affirmative.
It has been generally assumed, with virtually no examination,
that the same standard of conduct should be applied to defendant
and plaintiff alike." The prevailing position could be justified
by an argument for a kind of consistency. But true consistency
does not demand like treatment for unlike problems. And only a
servile and mechanical consistency calls for like treatment of con-
cepts which have a superficial likeness without probing more
deeply into the problems and policies which underlie the concepts.
So here, the word "negligence" is used on both sides of the scale;
but it does not follow that negligence and contributory negligence
are equally important to the objectives of tort law today or de-
serve equality of treatment.
Contributory negligence was a child of court-made common
law. The philosophy of laissez faire which regarded the employers
and employees as bargaining equals would quite naturally decline
to extend the aid of the courts to victims who had not used proper
" A large number of cases have dealt with a child as plaintiff, yet Char-
bonneau v. MacRury, supra note 57, was said to bring to three the total number
of cases in which the question of a child-defendant's conduct had come up. 79
U. oF PA. L. REv. 1153, 1154 (1931). In England the Charbonneau point "seems
never to have been decided." SALmOND, TORTS 61. Cases dealing with the physical
characteristics of defendants are scanty and confined almost exclusively to situa-
tions where the defendant has lost control of a vehicle through temporary illness
or unconsciousness.
" RESTATENMNT, TORTS § 289, comment a (1934); see Charbonneau v. Mac-
Rury, supra note 57, at 5o8, 153 Atl. at 461; see PROSSER, TORTS 395.
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care to prevent accidents. 6 It was quite natural, too, that the
stark individualism of the early I 9th century would impose
equally rigid standards of conduct on plaintiff and defendant in
an accident case; in that context, consistency of treatment for
negligence and contributory negligence made sense. However, in
the century and half since contributory negligence was born
there have been tremendous changes. Not only has the accident
problem itself assumed much greater proportions, but there has
been a major shift in economic and social philosophy. Even con-
servatives accept a large measure of the social insurance that has
been adopted in great areas of our economy. In the field we are
discussing the important segment representing industrial accidents
has been almost wholly covered by workmen's compensation laws.
The forces which underlie this trend would rule out personal
fault altogether as either a basis of or defense to accident liability.
They would emphasize the objectives of compensation for the
victim and a wide distribution of his loss. Short of this, they
call loudly for expanding the concept of negligence as a basis for
liability, because such an expansion serves both the moral ob-
jective (in a climate of opinion which sees an increasing responsi-
bility for the welfare of our fellow men) and the objective of
compensating accident victims. But the same forces call out as
loudly for restricting a defense which would serve only the morals
of a bygone individualism and would be a distinct disservice to
the need to compensate victims. So the vital policies behind negli-
gence and those behind contributory negligence are today dia-
metrically opposed and any notion that "consistency" demands
the same treatment for each is fatuous indeed. The defense of
contributory negligence has often been justified as a healthy de-
terrent against careless conduct on a plaintiff's part, just as the
law of negligence is justified as a deterrent against a defendant's
carelessnessJ7 But, as we have seen, this is putting the pressure
towards safety on the wrong person and relieving the pressure in
the quarter where it will do the least good.
What has just been said has had a profound, if often unper-
ceived, influence on accident law, and this influence has reached
the defense of contributory negligence, which "has been looked
' See Bohlen, Contributory Wegligence, 21 HAv. L. REv. 233, 235, 254
(19o8).
77 SALmoND, ToRTs r8 et seq. (Stallybrass throws some doubt on the present-day
correctness of this position); Lowndes, Contributory Negligence, 22 GEo. L.J.
674 (I934) ; cf. G asN, JuDGE AND JuRy 77, i1.
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upon with increasing disfavor by the courts" 7' and legislatures.79
The evidences of this disfavor are many: (a) The i 9 th century
common law of several of the- older states put on plaintiff the bur-
den of pleading and proving his own due care. Today most of those
jurisdictions have by statute or judicial opinion SO put on the de-
fendant the burden of pleading and proving contributory negli-
gence. (b) A number of statutes have restricted the defense of
contributory negligence or have substituted a rule of comparative
negligence for it."' (c) The courts have declined to extend the
defense of contributory negligence to cases where liability is pre-
dicated on wanton or wilful misconduct,82 or on acts done by
defendant at his peril.8 ' (d) The courts have not extended the
defense broadly to actions for nuisance."s  (e) The courts have
made serious inroads on the defense by creating the "last clear
chance" doctrine under which a different and more restricted con-
cept of proximate cause is applied to contributory negligence than
to negligence."' (f) The courts have often refused to extend the
defense to actions based on the violation of a statute intended to
protect the plaintiff from some of the weaknesses of his position
(e.g., child labor laws)."' (g) The law has shown a tendency
to restrict or to abandon rules imputing contributory negligence
78 PROSSER, TORTS 394.
7' See Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARv. L. REv. 317, 342
(1914) ("the defense itself is crumbling at many points under attacks both legisla-
tive and judicial") ; Smith, Sequel to Workmen's Compensation Acts I, 27 HA/v. L.
P-v. 235, 243 (1914) ("a decadent doctrine, which will ultimately disappear from
the law"); Leflar, The Declining Defense of Contributory Negligence, I ARx. L.
REv. I (1946).
8' CLARK, CODE PLEADING 303-07 (2d ed. 1947); PROSSER, TORTS 288.
81 See Howard, Torts- The Theory and Operation of Comparative Negligence,
22 So. CALIF. L. REv. 276, 278 n.8 (1949); Campbell, Ten Years of Comparative
Negligence, [1941] Wis. L. REv. 289, 304.
82Kasanovich v. George, 348 Pa. 199, 34 A.2d 523 (1943); RESTATEMMNT,
TORTS § 482 ('934); cf. Potter v. Gilmore, 282 Mass. 49, 184 N.E. 373 (x933)
(operation of unregistered vehicle no bar to suit based on wanton and reckless
conduct).
83 HARPER, TORTS § 152; PROSSER, TORTS 462.
84 See HARPER, TORTS § 193. There is, to be sure, authority that the defense
is available where the ground of the nuisance is negligence. McFarlane v. Niagara
Falls, 247 N.Y. 340, 16o N.E. 391 (1928). But cf. Beckwith v. Town of Stratford,
129 Conn. 5o6, 29 A.2d 775 (1942) ("absolute nuisance").
a- See James, Last Clear Chance: A Transitional Doctrine, 47 YALE L.J. 704
(1938); MacIntyre, The Rationale of Last Clear Chance, 53 HAIv. L. RaV. 1225
(1940).
86 See Leflar, supra note 79, at 6.
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to a plaintiff, while at the same time the vicarious liability of
defendants has been constantly expanded."
There is, therefore, a sound basis both in reason and on authority
for treating contributory negligence as a disfavored defense in a
system wherein liability for negligence is ever expanding. Surely
it is an entirely appropriate and logical part of this treatment to
adopt a double standard of conduct - that is, one which applies
a relaxed subjective test to the plaintiff and a more rigid and ob-
jective test to the defendant. There is already some authority for
this position. All states, for instance, allow the child-plaintiff the
benefit of his immaturity. Of the very few states which have faced
the question of a child-defendant's liability, some hold him to an
adult standard of care.8"
If the courts do not adopt an explicit double standard, however,
they are nevertheless likely to adopt rules which will allow the
operation of a tacit double standard in practice."9 They may do
this, for example, by admitting evidence of accident proneness and
inviting the jury to consider it as bearing on the standard of con-
duct of any party as to whom it is offered, without requiring the
jury as a matter of law to find a verdict one way or another on the
basis of it. Though theoretically such a rule would apply to
plaintiffs and defendants evenhandedly, it would in practice gener-
ally be used to excuse an accident victim from the charge of
contributory negligence.90
" See, e.g., N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 73; PROSSER, TORTS 500 ("family purpose"
doctrine); SUMM-,N AND JAMMS, CASES ON TORTS 407, 681-87 (1942); Seavey,
Speculations as to "Respondeat Superior" in HARv. LEGAL ESSAYS 433, 451-56
('934).
" Neal v. Gillett, 23 Conn. 437 (1855); see Roberts v. Ring, 143 Minn. 15i,
153, 173 N.W. 437, 438 (1919). Apparently in the ordinary automobile cases
parties and courts usually proceed in practice on the assumption that infant de-
fendants will be held to the ordinary standard of care. See, e.g., Transcript of
Record, p. 94, Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N.Y. io6, 22 N.E.2d 254 (1939) (charge to
the jury). A special note to the RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 167, comment e (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1929), stated: "There may be some doubt as to whether it is correct
to regard contributory negligence and negligence [of a child] as sufficiently analo-
gous to make one a safe basis for statements in regard to the other." The final
draft made full surrender to the argument from formal consistency.
S" Cf. Smith, Sequel to Workmen's Compensation Acts II, 27 HARv. L. REv.
344, 367 (1914).
9 This would be so for these reasons: (a) Such exculpatory evidence would
generally be offered for plaintiffs. See note 74 supra. (b) juries tend to resolve
doubts in favor of liability so that they would be more likely to accept the in-
vitation to relax the standard for the accident victim. See James, Functions of
Judge and Jury in Negligence Cases, 58 YALE L.J. 667, 687 (i949). (c) Where the
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We expect to see the courts increasingly admit evidence of
accident proneness where fairly accurate tests have been de-
veloped. But the nature of the judicial process and the habits of
professional thought are such, that the double standard may well
continue to operate largely in practice only, its explicit adoption
being reserved for bolder courts.
The recent studies may have further significance: an accident-
prone person may be required to take that failing into account in
engaging in dangerous activity like driving a car, at least where
he knows or has reason to know of his failing. 1 Some short-
comings are so serious that a man who has them would not be
reasonable in engaging in certain activities at all. But on the whole
the courts have been reluctant, except in very clear cases, to for-
bid the ordinary activities of life to the handicapped person.9 2 If
the handicapped are to be forbidden pursuits of normal living,
it will be by the legislature; and this is as it should be, for so
drastic a step should be taken, if at all, through the democratic
process. Short of this, reasonable care may well require the handi-
capped to do what they can to compensate for their knowable
shortcomings, so that, for instance, the man with slow reaction
time should drive more slowly than his fellows. 3 And an in-
creasing general knowledge of such things as accident proneness
may well enlarge the individual's duty to find out about himself.
Standard of Conduct of Nonparticipants.- The recent studies
have a possible bearing also on the standard of conduct that may
be required of people who stand in certain relationships to one of
the participants in an accident. With advances in knowledge
about accident proneness and in techniques for its detection, em-
ployers may be held to an increasing obligation to use that knowl-
defendant is not the driver but a third person, such as the driver's employer, any
relaxation of the standard of conduct prescribed for the driver personally is most
unlikely to be of any help to such third person even in the realm of legal theory,
as we shall presently see.
9' See, e.g., Diamond State Tel. Co. v. Hunter, 2 Terry 336, 21 A.2d 286 (Del.
Super. 1941).
"Thus the lame, the halt, the blind, and the very young may use the high-
ways, at least on foot, though in doing so they may both cause and encounter
greater risks than others. Statute apart, one-legged men and one-eyed men may
drive cars without necessarily being negligent in doing so. Madison v. Berry, 145
So. 694 (La. App. 1933). So may children fifteen years old, Black v. Hunt, 96
Conn. 663, xzi AtI. 429 (1921), although they have an accident record several
times as bad as that of older men.
93 Cf. Hughey v. Lennox, 142 Ark. 593, 598-99, 219 S.W. 323, 325 (X920) (in-
experience); see Weisiger, supra note 67.
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edge and those techniques for selecting accident-free employees
for jobs such as driving buses or trucks, or operating dangerous
machinery. Even if such a duty is recognized, however, it might
not affect the employer's liability in cases where respondeat.
superior applies. If the servant's conduct is tested by an objective
standard the master is fully liable vicariously wherever that
standard is not met, quite apart from any possible negligence in
hiring an accident-prone driver. And if the servant on the occasion
in question fully meets the test of reasonable, normal conduct, any
negligence in engaging him to drive can scarcely be a proximate
cause of the injury.94 If, however, the servant himself is given
the benefit of his accident proneness in any judgment of his con-
duct (which the writers think unlikely, at least when servant and
master are defendants), the further question arises whether in
determining the master's vicarious liability he is to be credited
with the same benefit. 5 If he is, the benefit might well be wiped
out by the added possibility of negligence in hiring a subnormal
employee.
The recent studies will open up new possibilities of negligence
on the part of employers, bailors, and others who are not vicari-
ously liable for the injuries caused by the accident-prone driver.
For example, many employers allow their salesmen or drivers to
use company-owned cars after hours for their own purposes. 8
In such cases the master's negligence in entrusting an automobile
to one whom he knew or should have known to be accident-prone
may provide the basis of liability that respondeat superior will
not,97 and evidence of the employee's accident proneness -
whether this consists of the results of tests or of past accident
record- should be allowed for this purpose. 8
Evidentiary Aspects. -To the extent the objective standard
remains intact, there is also a question whether evidence of a
9 Denver City Tramway Co. v. Cowan, 51 Colo. 64, x16 Pac. 136 (1911); Black
v. Hunt, 96 Conn. 663, x15 AtI. 429 (1921). This does not mean that the servant's
accident proneness may not, perhaps, be admissible in evidence to show the servant's
negligence and hence the master's vicarious liability.
" He was not so credited in Hill Transp. Co. v. Everett, 145 F.2d 746 (ist
Cir. 1944).
" See, e.g., Baldwin v. Singer Sewing Mach. Co., 49 Idaho 231, 287 Pac. 944
(1930).
7 See, e.g., Rocca v. Steinmetz, 61 Cal. App. 102, 214 Pac. 257 (1923).
" Bock v. Sellers, 66 S.D. 450, 285 N.W. 437 (i939); Clark v. Stewart, 126




person's accident proneness is to be admitted to show what he
probably did on this occasion. The difficulties spring chiefly from
the rule limiting the use of character to show conduct on a specific
occasion " and the inhibitions against the use of prior specific
instances 100 to throw light on what was done in the case at bar.
In civil cases the general rule is that evidence of a party's
character is not admissible to show what his conduct was on a
particular occasion, but that evidence of his habit or custom of
doing or omitting a particular thing may be received for this
purpose. 10 1 The general propensity to be negligent or careful has
usually been assimilated to character, and evidence of it excluded,
though on no very satisfactory ground. °2 It could scarcely be
urged that propensity is totally without probative value, though
perhaps its rational probative effect is too slight to warrant the
risks of an unduly long excursion into collateral matters and a
too facile overpersuasion of uncritical minds.' Such reasoning
would obviously exclude evidence offered to show that a party was
accident-prone for the purpose of proving that he was negligent
at the time of the accident. And this would be true however the
accident proneness was sought to be evidenced - whether by the
opinion of experts, by tests, by a showing of past accidents, or
otherwise.' 04
99i JONES, EVIDENCE IN CIVIL CASES [hereinafter JONES] §§ 148, 163a (4th
ed. 1938); i WI GmoRE, EVIDENCE [hereinafter WixmoRI § 64 (3d ed. 1940).
1003 WIGmORE § 987 lists the following reasons for this rule: (i) undue preju-
dice, (2) unfair surprise, (3) confusion of issues, and (4) lack of strong probative
value.
101 1 JONES § 163a; I WiGmoax § 92 et seq.
102 One reason advanced for excluding evidence of character is that inquiry
into it is irrelevant, because for the most part courts in civil cases are not con-
cerned with the moral quality of an act. See i WiGmoRE § 64. But that reason
applies to moral character and not to such personality traits as skill, competence,
or accident proneness.
103 See i JoNEs § 148: "In the eyes of the law, the inferences which might be
drawn from evidence of character or reputation of the parties are too vague, un-
certain and unreliable to be Worthy of consideration in determining the merits,
however just and reasonable such inferences may seem to the lay mind."
104 Of course, some of the data which would bear on accident proneness might
be admitted in an appropriate case on a narrower basis. Evidence of a man's
slow reaction time, for example, ought to be received to show that he did not
stop his vehicle within an improbably short distance. And the past accident
record of a driver might disclose a habit pattern of sufficient regularity to be
admitted on familiar principles. See, for instance, the description of the bus
driver with eighteen accidents mentioned on p. 772 supra.
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It may be urged with considerable force that the recent studies
invite reconsideration of the rule stated in the last paragraph, since
they afford a scientific basis for attributing more probative value
to accident proneness, when properly shown, than loose con-
clusions about propensity toward negligence deserve. Moreover,
the general rule has not commanded universal acceptance. Some
courts, for example, admit evidence of a person's general disposi-
tion to be careful in order to show care at the time of the accident,
where there are no eyewitnesses to his conduct at that time; 105
and very occasionally courts have admitted this kind of evidence
for such a purpose in cases beyond the scope of this exception.' 0
Under such rulings, proper evidence of accident proneness should
be admitted to show carelessness.
Where it is proper to show accident proneness for this or any
other purpose, there is a question of how it may be proven. The
results of specific tests of the individual in question should be
admissible if introduced through the testimony of a qualified
expert who can show that the tests are scientifically approved ones,
that they were properly administered in this case, and what the
significance of the result is °.0 7 The last might well be in the form
of an expert opinion whether the individual was accident-prone.
As we have seen, a conclusion as to accident proneness may
also be based on, or contributed to by, a clinical interview and ob-
servation or a past accident record. The former should be ad-
missible in evidence as an admission against a party to the action
if a qualified expert will testify as to its meaning. Where, how-
ever, the conduct of a nonparty is in issue (as where an employer
is sued for his employee's negligence), the subject's narrative as
to his case history will run afoul of the hearsay rule if offered
through the observer.' This difficulty could be obviated by
105 See I JoN.s § i63a; 3 WIo oRE § 65.
106 Poe v. Lawrence, 6o Cal. App.2d 125, 140 P.2d 136 (I943) (defendant's
inexperience and limited license entitled to some consideration by trial court in
determining whether defendant tried to beat another car through the intersection).
107 See Note, Scientific Gadgets in the Law of Evidence, 53 HARv. L. REV. 285
(31939); 3 WIcao- § 875; Cowan, The Relations of Law to Experimental Social
Science, 96 U. oF PA. L. Rlv. 484 (1948). See cases collected in MORGAw ram
MAG tmE, CAss o N Ev ENcE 576 n.8 (2d ed. 1942).
He should indicate how the history tends to show the fact of accident proneness.
Of course the narrative may have contained statements which are damaging to the
party's present position quite aside from the theory of accident proneness, and in
such cases expert testimony is unnecessary to show the statement's relevance.
108 6 WiGmoR §§ 1720, 1722.
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eliciting the narrative, on the stand, from the subject himself and
calling the expert simply to interpret it.
The admissibility of past accident records presents more diffi-
culty in view of the traditional reluctance of the law of evidence
to receive individual instances for the purpose of showing pro-
pensity, character, or the like. Exclusion has been based in part
on a supposed lack of strong probative value and on fear of en-
countering too many collateral issues.10 9 The recent studies should
reduce the force of both objections. They tend to indicate that
accident records have substantial bearing on the actor's conduct
at the time of accident. And they show that collateral inquiry
into the particular circumstances surrounding the other accidents
is largely unnecessary since the crucial fact is the mere repetition
itself of involvement in accident.
IV. CONCLUSION
The findings of the industrial psychologists who have studied
accident proneness show, we believe, that there is little cor-
respondence between dangerous conduct and moral fault, such
as carelessness or recklessness. They show, too, that defendants
as a class are far better able than victims to prevent accidents,
that employers were spurred on to make these very studies by
the imposition of absolute liability for industrial accidents. More-
over, they strongly suggest that effective precautionary measures
yield more in terms of increased productivity than they entail in
the way of expense. They point up the emptiness of the arguments,
both from morals and from expediency, which are currently used
to support the fault principle of liability. They represent, in
short, a strong further argument for comprehensive social in-
surance for accidents.
While the fault principle remains, defendants should not be
allowed to escape liability by showing accident proneness as an
excuse for conduct which would be negligent by ordinary stand-
ards. To let them do so would bring legal fault a little closer to
the moral fault of the individual, but at far too great a cost. It
would exclude from compensation persons injured by the most
dangerous (so far as causing accidents goes) class of the popula-
tion. And where the objective of conforming law to an individual-
istic morality comes into head-on collision with the objective of
109 See note zoo supra.
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compensating accident victims, the latter should prevail. The
standard for contributory negligence, on the other hand, should
be subjective and take the victim's accident proneness into
account, for a subjective standard for plaintiffs would both refine
the fault principle and compensate more victims.
